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Abstract An oft-rehearsed objection to the claim that an intention can give one
reasons is that if an intention could give us reasons that would allow an agent to
bootstrap herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one. Such
bootstrapping is utterly implausible. So, intentions to u cannot be reasons to u. Call
this the bootstrapping objection against intentions being reasons. This essay con-
siders four separate interpretations of this argument and finds they all fail to
establish that non-akratic, nonevil, and deliberatively sound intentions cannot be
reasons. The first argument is the argument from evil intentions, the second is the
argument from akratic intentions, the third is the argument from errors in deliber-
ation, and the last is what I call the ‘wizardry’ argument. This ‘argument’, put
forward most clearly by John Broome, claims that intentions are so insubstantial
that were they on their own reasons for action, that would amount to creating
something out of nothing and that is impossible. The essay argues that the claim that
intentions are insubstantial is too strong a premise to put forward without argument.
For there are other attitudes that are on their own sufficient to generate reasons, such
as loving attitudes. The essay then argues that the bootstrapping objection’s status as
dogma in the philosophy of action has led to insufficient attention being paid to the
entirely reasonable question of whether intentions are sufficiently like other reason-
giving attitudes, such as loving and valuing. It may turn out that, just as loving
someone can give the loving person a reason to act in a certain, so too can intending
to do something give someone a reason to act in a certain way, but we cannot
effectively engage this question without first giving up our commitment to the
bootstrapping objection as a central ‘‘insight’’ in philosophy of action. The essay
concludes by proposing two research questions that are opened up by the
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abandonment of the bootstrapping objection as dogma, and proposes that we turn
our philosophical attentions to those questions.
Keywords Philosophy of action  Bootstrapping  Intentions  Reasons 
Normativity  Rationality
1 Introduction
Philosophers often object to the claim that an intention can give one reasons by
arguing as follows. If an intention could give us reasons, then that would allow an
agent to bootstrap herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one.
But, such bootstrapping is utterly implausible. So, intentions to u cannot be reasons
to u.1 This is the bootstrapping objection against intentions being reasons.2
Some philosophers have resisted the application of the bootstrapping objection.
For example, although he presented what became one of the canonical formulations
of the bootstrapping objection, Michael Bratman recently attacked the bootstrapping
objection by arguing that an existing intention to u can sometimes give one a reason
to take the means to u-ing, where these are non-instrumental reasons of self-
governance.3 Bratman’s argument begins with a defense of the claim that
conforming to a norm of means-end coherence in intentions is constitutive of
self-governance. But, since (he assumes) we have reasons to be self-governing, then
we have non-instrumental reasons to conform to a norm of means-end coherence.4
Much of the resistance to views like Bratman’s (as well as to constructivist views
that appear to involve some kind of bootstrapping)5 is due to a deeply held
commitment to the bootstrapping objection. This commitment is widespread,
ironically due to Bratman’s own early efforts. In fact, the bootstrapping objection is
probably the closest thing there is to dogma in the philosophy of action and the
1 For the initial canonical statement, see Bratman (1987). Other statements include: Richard Holton
writes that ‘‘Forming an intention to do something surely cannot give one a reason to do it that one would
not otherwise have. If it did, we could give ourselves a reason to do something just by intending to do it;
and that cannot be right.’’ (Holton 2004). John Broome writes that ‘‘it is not credible that, just by adopting
some end, you make it the case that you have reason to pursue it’’ (2005b, Symposium 1). Joseph Raz
denies the ‘‘blanket conclusion that having goals or intentions provides reasons’’ (2005, Symposium 1).
For other statements of the bootstrapping objection as applied to both reasons for action and means-end
coherence, see Broome (2001, 2004, 2005a), Setiya (2007) (Setiya describes bootstrapping as ‘‘illicit’’ but
then goes on to defend a belief-based ‘cognitivist’ version of bootstrapping from the bootstrapping
objection); and Cullity (2008, pp. 57–95). See also the discussion in Ferrero (2010, especially pp. 3–6). A
very important and influential related discussion appears in Korsgaard (1997). There are many more
examples.
2 This version of the bootstrapping objection concerns only reasons for action and should be
distinguished from epistemic bootstrapping. For more on epistemic bootstrapping, see, e.g., Cohen (2002,
2010), Vogel (2008), and quite generally Weisberg (2012).
3 Bratman (2009).
4 This is a very rough sketch of Bratman’s complicated and compelling view.
5 See, e.g., Gibbard’s objections in his (1990: 140–164, 145). For a response to Gibbard, see Street
(2009).
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philosophy of normativity. Given its status as dogma, there hasn’t been much
exploration of the foundations of the bootstrapping objection.6 Instead, the usual
practice is either to recite, catechism-like, the claim that intending to do something
cannot give one reasons because that would be illicit bootstrapping, or to cite a few
cases that supposedly conclusively demonstrate that bootstrapping is impossible in
all relevant cases. The former approach—the mere recitation of the anti-
bootstrapping creed—fails to provide philosophical illumination. The latter
approach—citing cases—presents itself as a philosophically robust case against
bootstrapping. But, citing cases provides us only with epistemic reasons (although
perhaps strong epistemic reasons) to believe that the bootstrapping objection is
sound. Citing cases does not immediately reveal any explanation for why the
bootstrapping objection is sound.
So, we need to look further to find the deeper philosophical commitments supporting
the bootstrapping objection. This essay takes up that task, albeit skeptically. Its aim is to
show that the bootstrapping objection is not as philosophically robust as typically
assumed to be. I argue for suspension of judgment about the applicability of the
bootstrapping objection to certain kinds of intentions. The essay therefore doesn’t argue
that intentions are reasons. Pursuit of that goal is left for another time.
2 Overview
The bootstrapping objection is typically presented as applying to all intentions. It is
not hedged to cover only odd cases, such as only akratic intentions or only evil
intentions or only intentions formed as a result of poor deliberation.7
One reason for this is that a central question in philosophy of action is how to
understand the normative significance of our practical attitudes.8 The bootstrapping
objection can block one route towards resolving these puzzles, namely, the route
that goes via the reason-giving force of intentions. In this way, the bootstrapping
objection opens the way for some general claims about practical reasons and
rationality like, e.g., that we must reinterpret intentions as beliefs of some sort or
that we must reinterpret the normative significance of intentions in terms of a
‘lesser’ kind normativity like Broomean normative requirements.
To defeat the bootstrapping objection, then, I merely need to show that it doesn’t
apply to at least one important class of intentions. That does not mean that I must
demonstrate that at least some intentions are reasons. Rather, I need only to show
6 The exception is Pillar (2013). Pillar’s discussion bears some similarity to the following, although it
focuses exclusively on Broome’s views.
7 When John Broome, for example, writes, ‘‘…it is not credible that, just by adopting some end, you
make it the case that you have reason to pursue it,’’ he is giving his view, not offering a summary in which
he leaves out hedges (Broome, ‘‘Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz,’’
p. 1). See also the references in footnote 1 above, none of which hedge. But, see Bratman’s querying of
the bold formulation of the bootstrapping objection in footnote 19 of ‘‘Intentions, Practical Rationality
and Self-Governance,’’ pp. 416–417.
8 I thank Kieran Setiya for discussion on this point.
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that the bootstrapping objection as it is typically presented applies only to a small
class of deviant intentions and that in the absence of further argument we cannot
generalize from those deviant cases to all intentions.
More specifically, anti-bootstrappers assume that the intentions to which they
appeal in their arguments are paradigmatic intentions. They do this because if the
intentions they claim are subject to the bootstrapping objection are paradigmatic
intentions, then valid and informative generalizations can be made on the basis of
the characteristics of those intentions. I argue that the intentions on which the
bootstrapping objection focuses are in fact ugly and broken intentions, formed as a
result of evil reasoning or bad reasoning. Such defective intentions are at best
paradigms of what evil or bad reasoning yields. Why, one may reasonably ask,
should we treat outputs of malfunctioning processes as paradigms for the sake of
making generalizations about the outputs of well-functioning processes? We should,
instead, focus our study on the well-functioning processes and their outputs.
Before turning to the main arguments, it is worth noting that the bootstrapping
objection does not typically target an especially strong or peremptory intention-
grounded reason. The bootstrapping objection is concerned with all intention-
grounded reasons, be they conclusive reasons, sufficient reasons, peremptory
reasons, or just one reason among many. If, after reading this essay, a defender of
the bootstrapping objection decides to restrict her focus to a special class of
intention-grounded reasons such as peremptory reasons, then this essay will still
have made some contribution to the literature. For, were philosophers to begin
explicitly treating the bootstrapping objection as targeting only intention-grounded
peremptory or conclusive reasons, that would be a significant departure from the
way in which the bootstrapping objection is typically presented.9
In the remainder of the essay, I consider in turn four ways people might argue for
the bootstrapping objection: the argument from evil intentions, the argument from
akratic intentions, the argument from errors in reasoning, and what I shall call the
‘wizardry argument.’
3 The argument from evil intentions
Some try to show that the bootstrapping objection is devastatingly forceful by
arguing as follows.10 Suppose bootstrapping were possible. Suppose someone
intends to act wrongly. One thereby has a reason to act wrongly. But it is obviously
implausible that one can have a reason to act wrongly. Therefore, bootstrapping is
impossible: no intention could be a reason.
9 Mark Schroeder develops and exploits this point at length in an essay that has similar aims as this essay
(2005a, Symposium 1). See especially pp. 8ff.
10 For example, see Raz, ‘‘Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise,’’ and Raz, ‘‘The Myth of Instrumental
Rationality.’’ See also Bratman, ‘‘Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,’’ and citations
therein. Bratman ends with worries about Iago, whose intentions to act wrongly may give him a reason to
act wrongly.
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This argument is unsound. First, the inference from the claim that some
intentions, namely, intentions to act wrongly, are not reasons to the claim that all
intentions, whatever their content and deliberative history, are not reasons is
unwarranted. Second, one of the premises of the argument is false. For, there are
instances in which one has reasons to act wrongly. I shall primarily focus on this
second point.
A central question philosophers have asked about morality is how to manage the
tensions between prudential reasons, which can be reasons to act wrongly, and
moral reasons, which are reasons to act as morality requires. If it were obvious that
we never had prudential reasons to act immorally, then these tensions would never
arise and there would be no meaningful philosophical questions here. But, the
tensions between prudence and morality are (alas) all too easy to appreciate, and
there are plenty of meaningful philosophical questions regarding this topic.
Suppose someone is shooting at other people. One could stop the shooter by
rushing him, although one will probably die in the process. Suppose one is obligated
to risk one’s life in this way. One still has a strong reason of self-preservation to run
away from the shooter. But that is a reason to act in a way that is contrary to how
one is obligated to act, so one has a reason to act wrongly. This becomes quite clear
once we reflect on the fact that we so highly praise the person who risks their life
largely because that person has such a strong reason to run away. Some morally
required actions come at great personal cost and that cost can be characterized in
part in terms of the reasons one had not to incur that personal cost.
Cases of reasonable moral mistakes also supply us with examples of reasons to
act wrongly. Suppose one reasonably believes that one (morally) ought to u but in
fact one (morally) ought to w. It also happens that w-ing is incompatible with u-ing.
One explanation for such a reasonable mistake is that there are in fact many reasons
to u in addition to the many reasons to w. Such cases—cases in which it is difficult
to determine what the ‘balance of reasons’ is—may not be unusual. That there are
many, many reasons to do the wrong thing would explain why good and intelligent
people throughout history were so often wrong about what morality required of
them.
It seems, then, that reasons to act wrongly are fairly common. So, the argument
from evil intentions is unsound because it (at least) contains a false premise.
4 The argument from really evil intentions
Anti-bootstrappers may be tempted to double down on the argument from evil
intentions, arguing that the response above somehow misses the point. Disgusted,
they demand that the pro-bootstrapper consider an intention to commit genocide,
where this intention to commit genocide is adopted because of perverse ideology
(where argument fails, just invoke the Nazis, I guess). It is incredible, they say, that
a person’s ideologically driven intention to commit genocide can be a reason for
that person to commit genocide. This shows that all bootstrapping is impossible.
Alas, it is unwarranted to infer from (1) the proposition that ideologically-driven
evil intentions cannot be reasons to (2) the proposition that every intention cannot be
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a reason. What the anti-bootstrapper needs is an argument demonstrating that
intentions produced by the morally defective and ideologically warped exercise of
agency are relevantly indistinguishable from non-evil intentions produced by the
morally acceptable exercise of agency (all intentions are Nazi-intentions!). In the
absence of such argument, intellectual prudence recommends demurring from hasty
universal inferences made on the basis of intuitions about Nazi decision-making.
There just aren’t any existing versions of the argument from evil intentions that
block the pro-bootstrapper from energetically joining in with her frustrated anti-
bootstrapping colleague as he chants the anti-bootstrapping catechism: ‘‘An
intention to commit genocide cannot be a reason to commit genocide!’’ At some
point, the pro-bootstrapper should add, ‘‘But an intention to help the global poor
through activism or effective altruism, so long as it is the product of sound
deliberation, is itself a reason to do just those things!’’ What cunning response does
the anti-bootstrapper committed to the argument from evil intentions have to this
clunky new addition to his creed?11
5 The argument from akratic intentions I
Let us turn now to the argument from akratic intentions. We owe the canonical
formulation of this argument to Bratman.12 As initially presented in Intentions,
Plans, and Practical Reasons, it is quite detailed, but recently Bratman neatly
summarized the essence of this formulation of the bootstrapping objection (all in the
service of ultimately arguing for a kind of bootstrapping):
Suppose, that my decision in favor of end E is irrationally akratic: my
stable best judgment about the balance of reasons favors an alternative end F
over E. If my intention in favor of E were in general to provide a further
reason for the means to E, then such a reason would favor the means to E even
when my intention in favor of E is akratic. Such a reason might then tilt the
balance of reasons in favor of the means to E over the means to F. This would
be an odd kind of bootstrapping of the case in favor of the means to E over the
case in favor of the means to F. After all, from my own point of view the
intention in favor of E is ill-advised. Why would I, in general, suppose that
11 Imagine if the anti-bootstrapping catechism were, suitably altered, leveled against utilitarianism: ‘‘A
pleasure associated with genocide cannot be a valuable feature of genocide!’’ We are all familiar with this
sort of anti-Benthamite sloganeering, and few believe it alone refutes utilitarianism. Why should we take
it seriously as a conclusive demonstration of bootstrapping’s impossibility when similar rally cries blow
forth from the mouths of anti-bootstrappers?
12 Bratman, Intentions, Plans, Practical Reasons, pp. 24–27, and then picked up by almost every author
writing on the topic since. For a recent example, see Setiya (2014, pp. 56–82, 57–59). As noted above,
although Bratman’s description of bootstrapping is canonical, Bratman himself does not endorse a general
anti-bootstrapping position.
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this intention nevertheless provides me yet one more reason in favor of the
means to E over the means to F?13
Bratman’s formulation, though, is not as powerful as it at first seems. For, it
depends for its force on the akratic character of the agent’s intention. But akrasia is
a feature of deeply compromised agency. Given this fact, we may reasonably ask the
following: Are akratic intentions sufficiently like non-akratic intentions such that
non-akratic intentions, aside from being non-akratic, share all the same features
possessed by akratic intentions? It seems unlikely that this is so.
As an analogy, consider the noises made by broken tubas. These are not the same
as the noises made by well-functioning tubas. Why infer that all tubas are sources of
unpleasant noises on the basis of hearing the repellant honks produced by the tuba
that fell down the stairs? Similarly, akratic agency is like the busted tuba: it is
defective. And, like a broken tuba’s loud, unnerving toots, akratic intentions, which
are key products of akratic agency, are also defective. In both cases, we are
considering the unwholesome expressions of malfunctioning things.
Nothing licenses making, on the basis of observations of what the corrupt and
broken produce, universal claims about what expertly operated, well-functioning
things can produce. The only obvious claim one can make upon close inspection of
broken things produced by broken processes is this: When one properly uses a well
functioning system, the outputs are going to be in many ways better than the broken
outputs of broken versions of those systems.
In the absence of further argument, there is no reason to suppose that akratic
intentions are in the relevant ways indistinguishable from the intentions produced by
properly functioning agency. All we can conclude from Bratman’s appeal to akratic
intentions is that they cannot be sources of reasons. So much the worse for akratic
agency! We’ve learned little about whether well-functioning agency has reason-
generating powers.
So, one could—and perhaps should—both accept that the bootstrapping objection
applies to cases of akratic intentions and reserve judgment on the question of
whether acceptance of this claim commits one to the claim that intentions produced
by healthy deliberations by healthy agents are not reasons. Such forbearance is
especially apt given the aim of philosophy of action. Philosophy of action begins
with the exploration of non-defective, healthy agency and, in particular, with
intentions and actions produced by non-defective, healthy agency (just as music
theory focuses on music competently produced by the use of properly functioning
instruments). Akrasia and akratic intentions are important topics of inquiry. But
akratic agency is not agency’s paradigmatic form and akratic intentions are not the
paradigmatic form of intention.
In short, the appropriate conclusion to draw from Bratman’s example is that the
failure of akratic intentions to generate reasons is probably best explained by those
13 Bratman, ‘‘Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,’’ pp. 415–416. Bratman explicitly
notes that he is recapitulating his argument from Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. At footnote 16
on p. 416, which accompanies the text quoted in the main body of the present essay, Bratman writes,
‘‘This kind of example was a main concern of mine in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, 24–27.’’
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intentions being akratic. It is not best explained by the fact that those akratic
intentions are intentions.14 For, the best explanation for the normative insignificance
of defective intentions is the very thing that made those intentions defective,
namely, their being akratic. It is actually sort of bizarre to think that the best
explanation for defective intentions not being reasons is that those defective
intentions are intentions.
So, the argument from akratic intentions does no more than suggest the further
question, ‘‘But, can non-akratic intentions be reasons?’’ It does not supply us with
an answer to that question.
6 The argument from akratic intentions II
Another canonical version of the bootstrapping objection targets the non-akratic
agent. This version of the bootstrapping objection focuses on agents who make
errors in deliberation. John Broome is a well-known proponent:
Suppose you are wondering whether to visit Paris, but have not yet made up
your mind. There are reasons in favour and reasons against. Whether or not
you ought to go depends on the balance of reasons. Now suppose you make up
your mind to go, so now you intend to go to Paris… Suppose there is a slight
balance of antecedent reasons against going, but you made a mistake in your
calculations and wrongly decided to go. A short time later, having invested
nothing in the decision, you discover your mistake. Should you change your
mind? If intentions were reasons, there would automatically be a reason not to,
and if the balance of antecedent reasons was slight enough, you should stick to
your decision. But actually you should surely change your mind. Since you
have invested nothing in your wrong decision, you should change it.15
Call this the argument from errors in reasoning.
Let us interpret Broome as considering cases in which one realizes either that one
has deliberated on the basis of a false belief or that one has failed to appreciate that
certain interests are not as significant as they at first appeared. In such cases,
Broome seems to be saying, if bootstrapping were possible, then one could
somehow reverse one’s error in reasoning by doubling down on that error. One does
this by knowingly committing to the intention produced by the error-filled
reasoning. This reversal of error by knowingly committing to the error, which seems
to amount to making a second error, is implausible. So, bootstrapping must be
impossible.
In response, pro-bootstrappers can both endorse bootstrapping and argue that
even if intending to u on the basis of bad deliberations gives one a new reason to u,
realizing that one has deliberated incorrectly gives one yet another new and even
14 Analogously, the failure of the defective heart to pump blood correctly is probably best explained by
the heart’s being defective not by the heart’s being a heart.
15 Broome, ‘‘Are Intentions Reasons?’’ p 99.
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stronger reason in favor of abandoning that intention.16 So, one ought to give up the
bootstrapped reason. In this way, the pro-bootstrapper can both agree with Broome
when he writes that you should change your mind once you realize you’ve made a
mistake in your reasoning and consistently defend bootstrapping.
Let’s look at this a bit more carefully.
A pro-bootstrapper is not committed to the claim that once one intends to u, one
has settled the question for all eternity, come what may, about whether to u.
Bootstrapping occurs, if it occurs at all, because by deliberating about whether to
u and then forming the intention to u, one has changed the world. This change in
the world, like all changes in the world, can be a source or a trigger of ‘new’
reasons. But, the pro-bootstrapper needn’t hold that this is the end of the story. For,
as Broome himself observes, once one deliberates badly and thereby forms a stupid
intention, other things can also happen. In addition to the formation of the intention,
one also (according to Broome’s case) eventually gains the new knowledge that one
has made a mistake in one’s deliberations. That new knowledge can be a source of,
or a trigger for ‘new’ reasons. So, if an intention to u is a reason to u, then that
reason still has to face up to whatever reasons are produced or triggered by the
knowledge that one has deliberated very poorly in the lead-up to forming the
intention. So, just as the pro-bootstrapper can argue that an intention to u can be a
reason to u, the pro-bootstrapper can also argue that the knowledge that one has
made a mistake in one’s deliberations about whether to u can also be a reason, and
in this case a very powerful reason to abandon the intention to u and thereby to
‘give up’ the intention’s concomitant reason.
So far, I’ve claimed that it is open to the pro-bootstrapper to argue that when one
realizes one has made an error in one’s deliberations, then one probably has
overwhelming reason to reopen those deliberations. I think that this fact applies
even in cases in which one doesn’t realize that one has made an error in one’s
deliberations. Bad reasoning that leads to an intention is a practically significant
phenomenon. Just like other practically significant phenomena, such as coming
upon a person who needs your assistance, corrupt deliberations leading to an
erroneous intention can create or trigger a reason. In particular, corrupt deliberations
leading to an erroneous intention can create very strong reasons (1) to reopen those
very deliberations and then (2) to try to re-deliberate correctly.
Since having an intention to u blocks further deliberation about whether to u, it is
also open to the pro-bootstrapper to argue that even if an intention to u is a reason to
u, corrupt deliberations, in virtue of being a reason to re-open the question about
whether to u, ultimately require giving up that intention to u. Why? ‘Reasons of bad
deliberation’ are reasons to re-open deliberations. But, in order to re-open
deliberations one must abandon the intention in question. So, even if bootstrapping
is possible, when one forms an intention on the basis of incorrect reasoning, one
cannot, simply by forming that intention, permanently toggle the balance of reasons
from favoring one course of action to favoring another course of action. For, while
intending to u on the basis of corrupt deliberations may very well be a reason to u
16 A version of this view is explored in Richard Holton, ‘‘Rational Resolve.’’
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that on its own tips the balance of reasons in favor of u-ing, that reason becomes
irrelevant in the face of a much more powerful reason, namely, a reason, grounded in
the bad deliberations, that requires one to re-open deliberations about whether to u.
In short, when one makes an error in one’s deliberations about whether to u, and
especially when one realizes one has made this error, the thing to do is not to u (or
to do the opposite of u-ing!). Rather, the thing to do is to stop and reconsider. One
ought to try to eliminate the mistakes one made in one’s deliberations in order to act
on the best reasoning possible.
To illustrate this further, consider cases in which one luckily hits on the correct
intention despite one’s ‘mistaken calculations.’ Suppose I have many false beliefs. I
also deliberate badly. But, like a broken clock that is correct twice each day, I
sometimes luckily come to the correct conclusion about what I ought to do. Because
I deliberated badly, I still ought to suspend that intention and re-open deliberations.
That I accidentally hit upon the right answer about what to do is irrelevant. What
matters is that my deliberations were corrupt. And this applies doubly if I know that
I deliberated badly. So, in light of this, I ought not to u at that moment. What I
ought to do at that moment is to reconsider whether to u.
For example, suppose I drunkenly deliberate about whether to go to France,
reasoning on the basis of (1) the false belief that if I go, I will meet and then become
best friends with Serge Gainsbourg, (2) the ridiculous overweighting of my interest in
becoming a famous French race car driver, and (3) the bad inference from the claim
that I am best friends with Serge Gainsbourg to the claim that I will become a famous
French race car driver. As a result of these false beliefs, stupid desires, and corrupt
deliberations, I conclude that the balance of reasons favors my going to France. I
thereby form the intention to go to France. Amazingly, the balance of reasons does
favor my going to France because, unbeknownst to me, there are currently very cheap
flights, I need a vacation, my best friends will all be there visiting exactly the places
one might visit were one searching for Serge Gainsbourg, and the best vacation I
could take now would be an inexpensive one to France to see all my best friends (who
all happen to be Gainsbourg fans just like me). Should I hang on to my (objectively
correct) intention to go France? No. At the moment I concluded my drunken
deliberations, I ought not go to France. Why? Because were I to go to France at that
moment, I would not merely be going to France, I’d be drunkenly going to France for
the worst possible reasons! Those factors—that I am drunk, that I reasoned drunkenly,
that my intention to go to France is based on laughably terrible considerations—are
relevant to the question of whether I ought to go to France, just like considerations
about the cheap flights, the presence of friends in France, etc. So, given my condition,
what I ought to do is to abandon this drunkenly formed intention and to reconsider my
deliberations soberly. When I reconsider, I will realize correctly that I ought to go to
France. And so I will form the intention that, prior to my drunken reflections and
decisions, the balance of reasons recommended.
So, even if intentions are reasons, only those reasons grounded in intentions that are
products of sufficiently good deliberations can settle questions about how to live.
Reasons grounded in intentions that are products of bad deliberations ought to be
disregarded, regardless of whether these intention ‘track’ the balance of reasons. We
ought instead to re-open deliberations and so we ought to abandon the poorly formed
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intentions. That is, even if intentions are reasons, those reasons are outweighed or
defeated, or whatever, by the reasons grounded in one’s erroneous deliberations.
It follows that when it comes to an intention produced by bad reasoning that the
agent realizes is bad reasoning, it doesn’t matter one way or another whether
intentions are reasons. For, what one has strongest reason to do is abandon the
intention in order to reconsider how to live. There is no sense in which a pro-
bootstrapper must be committed to the view that, through bad deliberations, one can
fully settle the balance of reasons in favor of what, prior to the bad deliberations,
one lacked overall reason to do.
7 What can deliberations do?
What should be clear is that the real debate ought to be centered on what counts as
deliberations bad enough to require abandoning an intention and re-opening
deliberations.17 This is a tough question. For example, it is unclear whether
blamelessly having false beliefs one could have avoided are grounds for re-opening
deliberations. It requires further investigation before any firm conclusions can be
drawn. One might leach bootstrapping of its philosophical significance if one
assumes without argument that all errors of deliberation, including all deliberations
on the basis of any false beliefs, require abandoning one’s intentions and re-opening
deliberation. For, there are at least some considerations against re-opening
deliberation even under conditions of uncertainty or error.18
For example, slightly wonky deliberations or a few false beliefs shouldn’t require
one to re-open deliberations. In these cases, the anti-bootstrapping intuition should
not be very strong. Suppose, somewhat ridiculously (although this is how some of
the literature suggests we should think about reasons), that 51 % of the (weight of)
reasons prior to deliberation support my not going to France and 49 % of the
(weight of) reasons support my going to France. I deliberate pretty well, but make a
small error when considering just one of the reasons. Because of this error, I
wrongly conclude that 50.1 % of the (weight of) reasons support(s) my going to
France. I straightaway form the intention to go to France. The world has now
changed: on the basis of pretty good reasoning, I have settled for myself that I ought
to go to France by forming the intention to go to France. Has my forming this
intention tipped the balance of reasons in favor of my going to France? It seems that
the strength of any argument from errors in reasoning comes down to dueling
intuitions about these subtle close-call cases. All anti-bootstrappers who rest their
view on the argument for errors in reasoning have offered us is the bare intuition
that the balance of reasons has not shifted as result of my intention to go to France.
A pro-bootstrapper may demur on letting that bare intuition settle the question and
instead ask the philosophically substantive question: ‘‘Are intentions to u along
17 For more on this, see Holton (1999). See also discussions in Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical
Reason, chapters 5 and 7.
18 See, e.g., Hinchman (2003), Richard Holton, ‘‘Rational Resolve,’’ and Luca Ferrero, ‘‘Decisions,
Diachronic Autonomy and the Division of Deliberative Labor.’’
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with their sources, namely, pretty good reasoning about whether to u, sufficiently
important to count as reasons to u?’’ The bare intuition driving the argument from
errors in reasoning does not cleanly, much less informatively, settle this question.
As further support for skepticism regarding the philosophical power of the bare
intuition driving the argument from errors in reasoning, consider cases in which the
balance of reasons is in perfect equipoise between u-ing and not u-ing. If
bootstrapping is possible, then intending to u in this case upsets this balance in the
direction of the content of the intention. The argument from errors in reasoning
would have us believe that bootstrapping is obviously implausible in this case (since
the intention would be formed on the basis of subtly incorrect deliberations which
failed to pick up that the balance of reasons was in perfect equipoise). But, these
sorts of cases might plausibly invite a pro-bootstrapping intuition. For, when we ask
what the best tie-breaker would be for cases in which the balance of reasons is in
perfect equipoise, it seems that an intention made on the basis of even slightly bad
deliberations is an entirely reasonable sort of tie-breaker. Why, beyond a dogmatic
need to deny that bootstrapping is possible would one, in the face of someone else’s
intuition that in these cases an intention can settle what the reasonable course of
action would be, insist on the sovereignty of the intuition driving the argument from
errors in reasoning? Does it seem equally obvious that flipping a coin or that just
giving up on making any decision at all are the best responses to perfect equipoise?
Is the anti-bootstrapper committed to the view that giving up control over one’s life
is more reasonable than or, at best, no less unreasonable than taking control of one’s
life through deliberating about how to live (even if these deliberations contain small
errors)? My intuition, at least, is that this is a perverse view. I, at least, have the very
strong intuition that the fact that someone has considered how to live and has
decided that such-and-such a course of action is the one she will take is a perfectly
good tie-breaker between two antecedently equally reasonable courses of action. In
particular, by deciding that one course of action is the one to take, the agent breaks
the tie and makes it the course of action she ought to take. It is not just a case of
arational plumping. Why? Because well-founded intentions are reasons.
One might insist that I am begging the question here. My responses are as
follows. First, we are firmly in the game of contrasting bare intuitions. If the anti-
bootstrapper can rest a substantive normative thesis on the basis of the bare intuition
behind the argument from errors in reasoning, then why cannot I do the same on the
basis of another bare intuition? Second, and more substantively, any anti-
bootstrapper who aims to demonstrate the anti-bootstrapping claim without begging
the question must supply an explanation for why the pro-bootstrapping claim is
false, where that explanation does not itself rest entirely on the bare anti-
bootstrapping intuition. But my opponent merely repeats, catechism like, the claim
that intentions grounded in errors in reasoning cannot be reasons. That provides no
philosophically informative grounds for insisting that bootstrapping is always
implausible. It amounts to no more than thumping the table and scoffing.
Notice further that the pro-bootstrapper in the imagined case is not arguing for a
proposition that is as wild as the claims that pain is more valuable than pleasure or
that saving one person is better than (or not morally distinguishable from) saving ten
people. The pro-bootstrapper is saying that, if one intends to u on the basis of pretty
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good deliberations, and the reasons to u and the reasons not to u are in perfect
equipoise with one another, then intending to u on the basis of pretty good
deliberations can tip the balance of reasons in favor of u-ing. In the absence of
further argument against such a claim, only those who are already in the grips of the
anti-bootstrapping dogma will find this view beyond the pale.
But we’re not finished yet. Consider cases of underdetermination or indetermi-
nacy. Suppose there are both many reasons to u and many reasons not to u, but
there is no determinate weighting of the reasons in these two sets such that ‘the
balance of reasons’ supports one course of action over another. The ‘support’ for the
bootstrapping objection comes from it being supposedly obviously implausible that
an intention to u grounded in more or less sound reasoning could resolve this
normative indeterminacy in favor of u-ing. Once again, though, this is not an
obviously implausible way to resolve the indeterminacy. Even more so than what it
takes to resolve cases of the balance of reasons being in perfect equipoise, what it
takes to resolve normative indeterminacy is a difficult question. The claim that
intentions grounded in pretty good deliberations cannot on their own at least
sometimes resolve such indeterminacy in favor of the intended action is a
substantive philosophical claim. It cries out for justification that goes beyond bare
intuition-mongering.
I conclude that the argument from errors in reasoning fails to show that non-
akratic intentions that are products of acceptable deliberations cannot be reasons to
u.
8 The wizardry argument
There is one final interpretation of the bootstrapping objection that we can find if we
look closely at Broome’s discussion of bootstrapping. Before turning to this final
version, it is worthwhile to note a prejudice some might have about reasons for
action. This prejudice is that reasons for action pick out certain kinds of good-
making features, broadly construed, of the actions they support. So, the bootstrap-
ping objection might be understood as expressing the view that intending to u
cannot be a good-making feature (broadly construed) of u-ing. For, intending to u
does not change u-ing itself such that a new good-making feature of u-ing comes
into existence in virtue of intending to u.
This prejudice is unwarranted. For, while one’s attitudes towards an action do not
change the intrinsic character of the action, one’s attitudes towards an action can
make it the case that one has a reason to take that action. That I want to take the
stairs can be a reason to take the stairs.19 So, bearing a certain kind of psychological
relationship to an action can be a reason to perform that action.
19 This is not a metaenormative claim about what grounds reasons. Rather, it is claim in first-order
normative theory, namely the claim that desiring something, like that something being a good thing, can
be a reason, albeit not a conclusive or sufficient reason, to pursue that thing.
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This is an instance of the general view that one has a reason to u when one is in
the right kind of relation to u-ing.20 Our task as philosophers is to identify principles
that tell us which relations are such that being in those relations give us or don’t give
us reasons. For example, suppose A promises B that he, A, will u. This promise
gives A a conclusive reason to u. Why? Because there is a general normative
principle that says that being in a promising-relation to u-ing generates for the
promisor a conclusive reason to u.21 On the other hand, suppose C can financially
afford to u. This is not a reason for C to u. For, there is no principle that says that
being in the able-to-financially-afford-relation to u-ing gives one a reason to u.
With this in mind, let us consider the final interpretation of the bootstrapping
objection, which Broome suggests in some of his writings. Broome’s comments
about bootstrapping suggest that he thinks that intending to u is more like being
able to financially afford u-ing than it is like promising to u. On this account of the
bootstrapping objection, then, the justification for skepticism about intention-based
reasons depends upon the existence of a further normative principle that says that
the intending-to-u-relation is not significant. Intending to u just isn’t sufficiently
like, for example, promising to u such that it generates or triggers a reason to u.
For, while promising to u puts one into a substantive relationship with both another
person and an act type, merely intending to u puts one in an insubstantial
relationship to u-ing. Such mental-relationships lack the ‘reality’ of a promising
relationship. We cannot with just a flick of the mind conjure reasons from the vasty
(psychological) deep; we can call them but they won’t come. This is how we should
understand John Broome when he writes that ‘‘…it is implausible that you can give
yourself a reason, just by forming the intention of doing it. How can you create a
reason for yourself out of nothing?’’22
I call this the ‘wizardry argument’ against bootstrapping. But is there any
argument for the principle that says that being in an intending-relation to u-ing is so
insubstantial that it doesn’t put one in a reasons-relation to u-ing? In its absence, the
anti-bootstrapper is forced simply to slap his head and complain that the pro-
bootstrapping arguments are no more than philosophical alchemy aiming to
transform the lead of intentions into the gold of reasons. Let the rigorous science of
reasons be your guide, the anti-bootstrapper insists. This science of reasons—and it
is a science because according to it reasons have weights and all sorts of other
seemingly mathematical features—has revealed to us that intending to u is just too
close to nothing to be a reason to u.
20 I borrow (and tweak) this formulation from Schroeder (2005b). Nothing I say here is meant to engage
Schroeder’s argument in that essay. See also Enoch (2011).
21 How does one defend this principle? Immanuel Kant defends a perfect duty not to make lying
promises for the sake of gain in Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals by appeal to the Formula of the
Universal Law. David Hume gives a practice-based defense in (1742). Thomas Scanlon rejects this view
in (1990) and (1998), chap. 7. But see Kolodny and Wallace (2003).
22 Broome, ‘‘Are Intentions Reasons?’’ p. 99—emphasis added. Broome also writes that ‘‘…it is not
credible that, just by adopting some end, you make it the case that you have reason to pursue it’’ (Broome,
‘‘Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz,’’ p. 1).
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But even this version of the bootstrapping objection flies in the face of the above-
cited fact that psychological relations to the world do give us defeasible reasons to
do all sorts of things. So, the wizardry argument is just another clunky bit of
philosophical sleight of hand: it looks like an argument but it really is just an
instance of someone baldly begging the question. For, it is far more evident that
mental states alone—even suboptimal mental states—can change the balance of
reasons than it is that intentions formed on the basis of acceptable deliberations
cannot shift the balance of reasons.
For example, that A (non-pathologically) loves B is a reason for A to treat B
differently than A would treat someone she does not love, even if B is not the
perfect candidate for A’s love.23 If A stops loving B then A loses her reason to treat
B in the special loving manner. The explanation for all this is that there is a principle
that says that loving someone is valuable, and there is a fact about the nature of that
value, namely that properly responding to it requires treating the beloved differently
than those one does not love. This principle and this fact about what it is to properly
love someone together make the fact that A loves B a defeasible reason in favor of
A treating B differently than someone she does not love, even if that someone A
does not love is in some ideal sense a better candidate for A’s love.24 Thus, a
psychological attitude—loving someone—creates a reason ‘out of nothing.’
In general, (non-pathologically) valuing something gives both the valuing agent
and others who do not share those values reasons to act in certain ways, namely,
ways that involve treating those things differently than things that are not valued.
For example, if I value counting blades of grass, then I have a pro tanto reason to
count blades of grass and others have pro tanto reasons to allow me to count blades
of grass. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to valuing playing video games,
valuing jogging for its own sake, and so on.25 On this view, A’s caring about O or
A’s valuing O is a pro tanto reason for A to cherish, engage with, and promote O,
regardless of whether O is the best available candidate for A’s valuing.26 By coming
to value something, someone creates a reason for herself and for others ‘out of
nothing.’
The wizardry argument offers no independent grounds to think that intentions are
any different from promises, loves, or values. All that can be said for the wizardry
argument is that it points out that we do not yet have an argument one way or
23 For more exploring (and challenging) this point, see e.g., Velleman (1999), Kolodny (2003); and the
papers collected in Solomon and Higgins (1991).
24 I do not want to take sides in the buck-passing debate. Everything I say here can be around from a
value-first to a reasons-first view without affecting the argument.
25 See Darwall (2001), Jaworska (2007), and Smith (2013).
26 There are plenty of activities that are in themselves totally pointless beyond our valuing them or our
caring about them. It is in virtue of our caring about or valuing these activities that we thereby come to
have reasons to perform them and others come to have reasons to accommodate us in doing so. These
reasons may not be conclusive, but they are there. The idea is that in response to the question, ‘‘Why
should I treat that person or thing specially?’’ a perfectly good answer is, ‘‘Because you love her’’ or
‘‘Because you care about it.’’ The reason one correctly cites in response to the question, ‘‘Why should I do
this?’’ is a psychological state and not something about what that psychological state refers to (although
that would be okay as well). I am influenced here by Hieronymi (2005).
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another about whether intentions are like loves, cares, or values. All the wizardry
argument does is express an undefended prejudice against bootstrapping.
The argument about whether bootstrapping is possible is therefore joined around
the question of whether intentions are sufficiently unlike loving, caring, and valuing
such that being in the intending-to-u relation cannot matter in the ways that being in
the loving-, caring-, and valuing-relations matter.27
9 Conclusion
Whatever rational force the bootstrapping objection has, it probably has it only
when applied to evil and akratic intentions. For, we lack a widely known version of
the bootstrapping objection that demonstrates that all non-akratic and non-evil
intentions to u are not reasons to u. So, for now, we should suspend judgment about
whether (more or less) deliberatively sound intentions are reasons. This would allow
us to profitably turn our philosophical attentions to the following two questions, in
reverse order of their introduction in this essay:
1. How do intentions compare with loving and valuing attitudes when it comes to
their reason-giving or reason-triggering capacities?
2. At what point do deliberations become so bad that we have very strong reason
to abandon the products of those deliberations and reconsider the question at
hand?
Non-dogmatically engaging question 1 would help us to resolve the issue of
bootstrapping. I hypothesize that we would find many similarities between values
and intentions that would speak in favor of bootstrapping. Engaging Question 2
involves working the functions and normative significance of different forms of
practical deliberation. This, I believe, becomes especially salient if we have any sort
of answer to Question 1 that finds similarities across the attitudes of intending,
caring, valuing, and loving. For, my hypothesis is that since deliberations are
expressions of our most cherished rational capacities (namely our capacities to
shape our own lives through the use of rational reflection and projection), we will
conclude that we ought to be somewhat generous in the errors we allow for in our
deliberations. Regardless of the ultimate worth of this very tentative hypothesis, the
questions inspiring their formation are significant. But, such questions can only be
fully appreciated once we abandon the anti-bootstrapping dogma.
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